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NOTES
CONTRACTUAL DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTY
In early common law the doctrine of caveat emptor placed the
risk of the success of the transaction on the prospective vendee
in the absence of express warranties. But with the development
of the doctrine of implied warranties the risk of the transaction
was shifted to the vendor, who found himself bound beyond the
intention of the parties in many instances. It was primarily in
order to repose the risk, once again, upon the vendee that the
device of contractual disclaimer was invented.
The disclaimer of warranty is a fairly recent development.
Although there may have been a few scattered cases involving
this device at an earlier date, this instrument is first noticed
around the start of the twentieth century. From 1897 to 1926
the development was gradual. Throughout the United States
during those thirty years some fifty or more cases involving dis-
claimers were decided. But in the last ten years, from 1927 to
the present, this development has numbered over sixty cases.
Such an increase in the number of cases is merely a means of
measuring a vastly wider trend and a much broader development
in the use of disclaimers, for only a small minority of the actual
instances of use of a disclaimer ever are brought before a court.
This device is noticeable mainly in the southern, north-central
and far western states. Although it has extensive use through-
out the commercial world in any and every sale to the consumer,
disclaimers are used chiefly in three types of transactions: sales
of seed, sales of fertilizer, and sales of mechanical implements.
This may be due to various factors: possibilities for enormous
speculative damages, possibility of the vendor not having the op-
portunity to be aware of the true nature and qualities of the
goods he sells, and perhaps just to a general trepidation against
bearing the risk of the success of the transaction. But its use is
by no means limited to these commodities.
Now, as has been said above, the sole purpose of the disclaimer
of warranty is to repose the risk of the transaction upon the
prospective vendee. If it fails in this purpose, the disclaimer is
of no use whatsoever. This article is intended to deal solely with
the consideration of how to make the disclaimer most effective
and thereby succeed in the accomplishment of its purpose. It
excludes such questions as the parol evidence rule, the exclusion
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of implied warranties by express warranties, a full and complete
discussion of the distinction between conditions and warranties,
and other independent problems which, although relevant to the
general subject, are too lengthy to be included. Also it is con-
fined to American law and does not treat the English cases on
this subject. It treats solely the considerations in drafting a dis-
claimer in this country which will effectively cast the risk of
the transaction upon the vendee and relieve the vendor from lia-
bility for defects in the article or articles of sale. The intention
of the writer should not be construed, however, as favoring the
right of the vendor to avoid all liability through the use of dis-
claimers, and so militate against the interests of the vendee. That
question of policy is for the legislature, and in the absence of
legislative action thereon a merchant should be justified in at-
tempting so to draft his contract within the provisions of the
law as to make it most satisfactory to his own interests.
In conformity with general principles of the law of sales, the
intention of the parties controls and the contract of sale is the
document containing that intention. In their agreement the
parties may define and restrict their respective rights and liabili-
ties, and this power is unrestrained as long as it conforms with
public policy. This right is too firmly established to require the
citing of a long list of cases asserting the right., The funda-
mental question is how may this right be most effectively exer-
cised to reach the desired result?
I. NOTICE
The first consideration in the effectual use of the disclaimer is
that the disclaimer must have been brought to the notice of the
vendee before it can be binding upon him. This element is im-
portant because many disclaimers are found in billheads, in cata-
logues, on containers, and on cards or slips inserted in the pack-
age containing the article or articles purchased, and in other out-
of-the-way places likely to escape the attention of the buyer. As
a general rule, in accord with ordinary principles of Contract
Law, the disclaimer, unless brought to the notice of the parties
is of no effect and will be excluded from the evidence.2 An ex-
1. Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Hocking, 54 N. D. 559, 209 N.
W. 996 (1926) ; Leonard Seed Co. v. Crary Canning Co., 147 Wis. 166, 132
N. W. 902, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 79, Ann. Cas. 1912D 1077 (1911) ; Uniform
Sales Act, sec. 71.
2. Amzi Godden Seed Co. v. Smith, 185 Ala. 296, 64 So. 100 (1913) ; Win.
A. Davis Co. v. Bertrand Seed Co., 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 Pac. 123 (1928);
Vaughan's Seed Store v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 708, 48 So. 410 (1909) ; Bliz-
zard Bros. v. Growers' Canning Co., 152 Ia. 257, 132 N. W. 66 (1911);
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ceptional case on this point is Calhoun v. Brinker3 which would
seem to waive the question of notice, and hold that the vendee is
bound in spite of the lack of actual notice. But the vast weight
of authority would urge the party making a disclaimer expressly
to call attention to the buyer of this fact in order to be safely
protected from future liability.
II. FRAUD OR UNFAIR ADVANTAGE
Although not involved in the actual drafting of a disclaimer,
it is impossible to overlook the factor that courts will relieve
upon the proof of fraud or other similar pleas.4 As the court said
in Davis v. Joyner:z
"Defendant was bound by these statements, unless he showed
that he could not read, and was for that reason imposed
upon, or that the note was signed under some emergency
which excused the failure to read, or that the failure to read
was brought about by some fraud or misleading device of
the payee of the note."
So it may be that a disclaimer, perfectly good in all other re-
spects, will be voided by a court on some equitable grounds as
regards the obtaining of the disclaimer rather than because of
its form or contents.
III. CONDITION OR WARRANTY
Courts have failed to consistently distinguish between a condi-
tion and a warranty in determining the effect to be given to a
disclaimer; so we find parties being held liable under implied
warranties in the face of seemingly good disclaimers.0 As one
court held:7
"Contracts here involved relieved plaintiffs from the obliga-
tions incurred by any such warranty (implied warranty of
Black v. B. B. Kirkland Seed Co., 158 S. C. 112, 155 S. E. 268 (1930) ; and
Longino v. Thompson, 209 S. W. 202 (Tex., 1919).
3. 17 Ohio Dec. 705 (1907). The theory of this case is that the printing
on seed package and in catalogue constitutes the contract of sale. The
decision should be confined at least to its facts, i. e., a small transaction
involving a very small purchase out of the usual course of commercial
transactions in the seed business.
4. Tharpe v. Griffin, 144 Ga. 486, 87 S. E. 479 (1915) ; Mock v. Kemp &
Lewis, 17 Ga. App. 448, 87 S. E. 608 (1916); and International Harvester
Co. v. Bean, 159 Ky. 842, 169 S. W. 549 (1914).
5. 27 Ga. App. 132, 132, 107 S. E. 551 (1921).
6. Hobdy & Read v. Siddens, 198 Ky. 195, 248 S. W. 505 (1923); Na-
tional Seed Co. v. Leavell, 202 Ky. 477, 259 S. W. 1035 (1924). See also
Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Breed Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35
(1915).
7. Downey v. Price Chemical Co. and Proto-Feed & Guano Co. v. Price
Chemical Co., 204 Ky. 98, 103, 263 S. W. 690 (1924).
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fitness for communicated purpose) but did not relieve them
from the implied warranty that the article sold was of the
particular commercial kind or character which its descrip-
tion indicated."
How is one to distinguish these two warranties, unless one is said
to be a condition? In Lumbrazo v. Woodruff,8 the New York
Supreme Court said:
"It is unimportant whether we consider the pencil writing
an express warranty, an implied warranty, or a condition....
There must be delivery of the kind of seeds ordered, unless
the nonwarranty clause is specific. In other words the seed
must be true to name. It is regarded, not as a breach of war-
ranty, but of a condition."
Judgment was given to the vendee. The court, while using con-
tradictory language, did not recognize that it was vitally im-
portant to distinguish between a condition and an implied war-
ranty in reaching a conclusion in any one case. On appeal the
judgment was reversed, the court saying,9 "All these distinctions
causing more or less confusion and uncertainty in the law have
been swept away by the Uniform Sales Act... ." The appellate
court went on to say that today there is merely an implied war-
ranty of description against which the disclaimer was effective.
If the Supreme Court was mistaken in failing to recognize the
importance of the distinction, the Court of Appeals was still more
mistaken in claiming that the Uniform Sales Act abolished the
distinction. The case of Smith v. Oscar H. Will & Co.10 illus-
trates the fact that there is still a distinction between a warranty
and a condition even under the Uniform Sales Act; and that a
disclaimer is ineffective as against a true condition.
No attempt is made here to go into the details and incidents
of this distinction, but it is sought merely to point out that there
is a valid distinction to which different incidents attach and that
different rules of law govern the two types of obligation. It is
important in the future for the sake of clarifying the law on this
point, that the courts recognize more fully the existence of this
distinction. Otherwise it is impossible to foretell whether a dis-
claimer will exclude liability under an implied warranty which
may be incorrectly termed a condition of the sale and so beyond
8. 242 N. Y. Supp. 335, 339 (1930).
9. 256 N. Y. 92, 96, 175 N. E. 525 (1931).
10. 51 N. D. 357, 199 N. W. 861 (1924). Also a case of mistake in seed.
Action for breach of contract was allowed, and disclaimer was held imma-
terial as this was not action for breach of warranty. See also Vold, Sales
(1931) 436.
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the power of the vendor to avoid; or whether, on the other hand,
liability will be avoided under a condition because it is considered
an implied warranty and so subject to a disclaimer. It also will
be well to keep in mind this distinction under a later section on
statutory imposition of liability beyond that imposed under im-
plied warranties.
IV. STRICT AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
The most important question to be answered before a dis-
claimer can properly be drafted in any one state is, does that
state adopt the rule of liberal or strict construction as regards
disclaimers? The strict rule distinguishes between an obliga-
tion implied from the agreement of the parties and an obligation
imposed by operation of law, and requires that the language of
the disclaimer specifically cover both; while the liberal rule does
not consider such a distinction in construing a particular dis-
claimer. The entire success of the disclaimer in avoiding lia-
bility under implied warranties depends upon the solution to this
problem, for a disclaimer perfectly good in one state may be
utterly inadequate in another because different rules of construc-
tion are applied. On this question there is a wide split of author-
ity depending mainly upon the theory of the nature of the im-
plied warranty which has been adopted in a particular state.
There is a respectable line of authority taking the liberal rule
of construction.11 This rule is based upon the old theory that an
implied warranty is derived from the intention of the parties.
As said in Couts v. Sperry Flour Co.:12
"In order to recover upon a warranty there must be two
factors present, first, an affirmation of fact by the seller with
reference to the thing sold, and, second, an intention on the
part of the seller that his affirmation shall constitute a war-
ranty."
11. Hartin Commission Co. v. Pelt, 76 Ark. 177, 88 S. W. 929 (1905);
Couts v. Sperry Flour Co., 85 Cal. App. 156, 259 Pac. 108 (1927); Win. A.
Davis Co. v. Bertrand Seed Co., 94 Cal. App. 281, 271 Pac. 123 (1928);
Burntisland Shipbuilding Co. v. Barde Steel Products Corp., 278 Fed. 552
(D. C. Del., 1922); Jones v. George S. Riley, Jr., Co., 14 Ga. App. 84, 80
S. E. 341 (1913); Barrineau v. Holman, 21 Ga. App. 159, 93 S. E. 1021(1917) ; The Sterling-Midland Coal Co. v. The Great Lakes Coal & Coke Co.,
334 Il. 281, 165 N. E. 793 (1929); Heller v. Franklin-Butler Motors, 259
Ill. App. 358 (1930) ; Burnett v. Hensley, 118 Ia. 575, 92 N. W. 678 (1902) ;
W. F. Dollen & Sons v. Carl R. Miller Tractor Co., 214 Ia. 774, 241 N. W.
307 (1932) ; S. F. Bowser & Co. v. Birmingham, 276 Mass. 289, 177 N. E.
268 (1931); Potter v. Shields, 174 Mich. 121, 140 N. W. 500 (1913); Little
v. Widener, 226 Mo. App. 525, 32 S. W. (2d) 116 (1930) ; Laitner Plumbing
& Heating Co. v. McThomas, 61 S. W. (2d) 270 (Mo. 1933); and McCabe
v. Standard Motor Const. Co., 106 N. J. L. 227, 147 Atl. 466 (1929).
12. 85 Cal. App. 156, 259 Pac. 108, 109 (1927).
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And again in another case it is said:'13
"In order to imply a warranty from the language or con-
tract of the seller an intention to warrant must be apparent,
and it would be anomalous to hold that a warranty of grade
or quality will be implied from the sale of a commodity by
description where the seller expressly refuses to warrant."
Under this rule of construction, the drafting of a disclaimer is
relatively simple, for any language sufficient to indicate the in-
tention of the seller that he does not guaranty or warrant the
goods is sufficient. It is also apparent that, applying this rule of
construction, it is impossible to obtain a liability contrary to and
in opposition to the intention of the parties.
There is an equally respectable line of authority adopting the
strict rule of construction.14 This particular rule is based upon
the modern theory that an implied warranty is an additional
liability imposed upon the parties by operation of law and is out-
side of and beyond the express agreement of the parties. As said
in J. B. Colt Co. v. Bridges:15
"A warranty may be either express or implied. The former
is created by the statement of the seller. The law creates the
implied warranty.... The latter does not arise from the con-
tract of the parties. It is the offspring of the law. The as-
sertion of the implied warranty does not in any way con-
flict with the stipulations of the written contract of sale
that the instrument contains all the agreements of the
parties."
In drafting a disclaimer to conform with this rule of construc-
tion, it is necessary to be extremely careful of the form and con-
tent of the disclaimer. Of course, any disclaimer which specifi-
cally excludes liability under "implied" warranties, normally
will be successful even under strict construction;16 but if the
13. Hartin Commission Co. v. Pelt, 76 Ark. 177, 179, 88 S. W. 929 (1905).
14. J. B. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (1926); Hardy
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S. E. 327 (1928) ;
Stracener v. Nunnally Bros. Motor Co., 11 La. App. 541, 121 So. 617 (1929),
rehearing denied 11 La. App. 541, 123 So. 911 (1929); Little v. G. E. Van
Syckle & Co., 115 Mich. 480, 73 N. W. 554 (1898); Lutz v. Hill-Diesel En-
gine Co., 255 Mich. 98, 237 N. W. 546 (1931); Bekkevold v. Potts, 173
Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927); S. F. Bowser & Co. v. McCormack, 243
N. Y. Supp. 442 (1930) ; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Wirtz, 15 N. D. 477, 107
N. W. 1078 (1906) ; J. A. Campbell Co. v. Corley, 140 Ore. 462, 13 P. (2d)
610 (1932) ; The White Co. v. Francis, 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 315 (1928) ; Liquid
Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S. C. 40, 159 S. E. 461 (1931) and 166 S. C.
400, 164 S. E. 895 (1932). See also Vold, Sales (1931) 468.
15. 162 Ga. 154, 158, 132 S. E. 889 (1926).
16. Williams v. Bullock Tractor Co., 186 Cal. 32, 198 Pac. 780 (1921);
Bridgeport L. A. W. Corp. v. Levy, 110 Conn. 255, 147 Atl. 841 (1929);
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word "implied" is not so used, liability may attach beyond the
actual intention of the vendor: as where the disclaimer read,
"covers all the agreement,117 "no warranties have been made by
the seller unless indorsed hereon in writing,"' 8 "we will not be
responsible for any written or verbal contract or promise other
than written or printed on the face of this contract,"',, or "no
warranties have been made by the seller to the buyer unless
written hereon."20 It should be noticed that all these cases drew
a distinction between liabilities agreed to by the parties in their
written contract and liabilities imposed by operation of law; the
disclaimer in each case being construed to apply only to implied
warranties of the former type and not to those of the latter.
Under the liberal rule of construction any or all of these dis-
claimers would have been sufficient. It is true that these courts
say that they are merely "getting at the intention" of the parties,
but it seems obvious, that, in reality, they are disregarding the
ill-stated intention of the vendor not to be bound beyond his
express stipulations, which would exclude implied warranties of
all types.
In framing a disclaimer, it is obvious that it would be better
in all cases so to word it that it will withstand the application of
the rule of strict construction. Then the vendor can feel sure
that in any case he will be amply protected, and that the con-
tract of sale, in law, will be held to contain the "entire agree-
ment" of the parties. This can best be accomplished by framing
the disclaimer so as expressly to exclude warranties "implied by
operation of law or otherwise."
V. LOOSE LANGUAGE AND MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Frequently it happens that because of the loose wording of
the disclaimer the courts, in interpreting such a contract, attach
to the phrase a meaning not intended by the parties. Because
of such interpretation the disclaimer may be useless as it fails
to exclude certain liabilities, which purpose was the very reason
for having a disclaimer in the contract.
Such would seem to be the result in Miller Rubber Co. v.
Davis v. Joyner, 27 Ga. App. 132, 107 S. E. 551 (1921) ; Kolodzcak v. Peer-
less Motor Co., 255 Mich. 47, 237 N. W. 41 (1931); Industrial Finance
Corp. v. Wheat, 142 Miss. 536, 107 So. 382 (1926) ; and Sayeg v. Gloria
Light Co., 259 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1932).
17. J. B. Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 132 S. E. 889 (1926).
18. Hardy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 38 Ga. App. 463, 144 S.
E. 327 (1928).
19. Little v. G. E. Van Syekle & Co., 115 Mich. 480, 73 N. W. 554 (1898).
20. Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N. W. 790 (1927).
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Blewster-Stevens21 where the contract contained a provision that
the "warranty was given solely to the original user," but one
other than the original user was allowed to recover on an implied
warranty on the ground that there was no express refusal to
warrant. Likewise in New Birdsall Co. v. Keys, 22 where the con-
tract read "this warranty does not apply to secondhand machin-
ery or machines that are manufactured by parties other than the
New Birdsall Co.," recovery was allowed on such machinery
under an implied warranty. The court held that the provision
prevented the express warranty from applying, but did not pre-
vent the implied warranty. And in Hansmann v. Pollard,23 where
there was a provision that unless a note was given for the pur-
chase price before delivery vendor was "discharged from all
warranties," the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that this ap-
plied to the express warranties but not to implied warranties.
In two North Carolina cases 24 the provision read, "without any
warranty as to results from its use or otherwise." The court
held that "or otherwise" did not include implied as well as ex-
press warranties and so allowed recovery under an implied war-
ranty. A disclaimer drafted so as to cover implied as well as
express warranties would have avoided such fatal interpretation
in these cases.
A different type of disclaimer was involved in Watson v.
Smith'2 but a somewhat similar result was reached. There the
disclaimer read "Does not warrant health, life, and soundness
of said stock, but only the title thereto." This would seem to
indicate an intention to warrant nothing except the vendor's
title. The court, however, limited the extent of the refusal to
warrant and confined such refusal to the particular things named,
or closely related subjects, and held that there was no express
refusal to warrant that the horse sold was reasonably suited for
the purpose intended. The court intimated that it might have
been otherwise if the language had been broader and more com-
prehensive. That case should be compared with Payne v. Chal-
Max Motor Co. 2 1 which contained a provision that "vendor does
not warrant said property except that the title to same is in
vendor and free from encumbrance." There the court held that
21. 171 Ark. 1179, 287 S. W. 577 (1926).
22. 99 Mo. App. 458, 74 S. W. 12 (1903).
23. 113 Minn. 429, 129 N. W. 848 (1911).
24. Swift & Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N. C. 162, 129 S. E. 453 (1925); and
Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141 (1926).
25. 15 Ga. App. 62, 82 S. E. 633 (1914).
26. 25 Ga. App. 677, 104 S. E. 453 (1920).
19371 NOTES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol22/iss4/9
544 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 22
the provision amounted to an express refusal to warrant and
that this refusal was so broad that it extended to and covered
any implied warranty. But the disclaimer was essentially the
same in both cases.
This problem comes very close to that raised by another very
large class of cases, contracts in which liability is avoided due to
the contract or conduct of the parties. 27 By this is meant that
in certain cases the peculiar terms of the contract, for instance
sale "as is," or the conduct of the parties and the circumstances
surrounding the transaction are such as to exclude the possibility
of recovery under an implied warranty. Although the same re-
sult may be reached in both instances, these are not true dis-
claimers, and therefore a thorough consideration of those cases
is not included here.
In the previous cases, where recovery was allowed, it was due
to the failure of the vendor to make his intention sufficiently
clear and so the blame was on him. But that cannot be said of
the decision in Ideal Heating Co. v. Kramer28 where there was
present the usual disclaimer that the writing "shall fully express
the agreement between the parties ;" yet the court held that the
clause "is nothing more than a paraphrase of the long-settled
rule of law that the writing is presumed to contain the entire
agreement, and parole evidence is not admissible to vary its
terms. It does not exclude an express warranty where one-other-
wise would be found. ' 29 The same view was taken in the Iowa
case of Hughes v. National Equipment Corp.0 and the Missouri
case of National Cash Register Co. v. Layton. 1 This result could
only be explained in the light of the strict rule of construction,
although it would seem that Iowa and Missouri are liberal in this
regard . 2 If disclaimers generally are to have any value what-
soever, it is necessary to consider them as more than a mere
codification of the parole evidence rule.
An infrequent situation is found in a Minnesota,, and in a
27. Ferguson v. Kock, 204 Cal. 342, 268 Pac. 342, 58 A. L. R. 1176(1928); Morris Run Coal Co. v. Carthage Sulphite Pulp & Paper Co., 206
N. Y. Supp. 676 (1924), order affirmed 242 N. Y. 567, 152 N. E. 430 (1926) ;
Fruit Dispatch Co. v. C. C. Taft Co., 197 Ia. 409, 197 N. W. 302 (1924);
Yandell v. Anderson & Spilman, 163 Ky. 702, 174 S. W. 481 (1915); and
Tamkin v. Nelson-Dowling Coal Co., 82 N. H. 96, 130 Atl. 26 (1925).
28. 127 Ia. 137, 102 N. W. 840 (1905).
29. 127 Ia. 137, 143, 102 N. W. 840 (1905).
30. 216 Ia. 1000, 250 N. W. 154 (1933).
31. 207 Mo. App. 454, 232 S. W. 1091 (1921).
32. See notes 11 and 14 supra.
33. Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N. W. 484
(1917).
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Massachusetts case.34 In these cases the original contracts were
oral and without disclaimers, but later written agreements were
drawn up which contained disclaimers. The courts decided that
there could be a recovery on oral warranties made in the earlier
contracts and that these warranties were not defeated by the
subsequent disclaimers since the original contracts were in fact
performed.
The reverse situation arises where under a written contract of
sale including a disclaimer goods are sent to the buyer and there
follows a substitution of part of the goods. In this situation the
courts have reached directly opposite results. In Kibbe v. Wood-
ruff" it was held that subsequent delivery was controlled by the
conditions of the written order, while in Ward v. Valker36 the
court decided that the clause in the original order was not ap-
plicable to the sale of the substituted goods. The Connecticut
decision seems the better result in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances surrounding the substitution such as were present
in Ward v. Valker, for as the court there states, 7 "Plaintiff's
letter complaining of the mistaken delivery of the peas does not
purport to launch a new contract; it demands the fulfillment of
an existing one" and this would seem to be the proper way to
approach the problem unless the substitution does actually
amount to a rescission of the first contract and the establishment
of a new agreement.
Finally in Jolly v. C. E. Blackwell & Co.38 the rule is laid down
that a disclaimer does not run with the property and enure to
the benefit and disadvantage of an assignee of the purchaser.
VI. NONWARRANTY BY CUSTOM
In certain businesses the almost universal practice has grown
up to refuse to give any guaranties or warranties whatsoever as
to the subject of sale; this is especially true in transactions in-
volving the sale of seed. The question immediately arises as to
what effect, if any, such a widespread practice or custom has on
the legal rights otherwise secured to the parties. Here again it
seems proper to go back to the two fundamental theories of the
nature of the implied warranty.
34. Edgar v. Breck, 172 Mass. 581, 52 N. E. 1083 (1899).
35. 94 Conn. 443, 109 Atl. 169 (1920).
36. 44 N. D. 598, 176 N. W. 129 (1920). However, the court was largely
influenced in reaching this decision because the vendor exercised an unusual
degree of discretion in the substitution of the goods. This might be sufficient
ground for distinguishing the two cases on their facts.
37. 94 Conn. 443, 445, 109 Atl. 169 (1920).
38. 122 Wash. 620, 211 Pac. 748 (1922).
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Assuming that the modern theory is correct, i. e., that an im-
plied warranty is an obligation imposed by law,"9 an insurmount-
able principle arises that customs and usages cannot be estab-
lished in contradiction with the law.40 This principle would pre-
vent the vendor from proving a custom to refuse to warrant in
order to escape liability under an implied warranty if such lia-
bility is enforced by law regardless of the contract of the parties.
Such is the view taken in American Warehouse Co. v. Ray.4'
But the weight of authority is to the contrary,42 and proof of
a custom will generally protect the vendor. This is in conformity
with the older theory that an implied warranty is derived from
the intention of the parties ;43 for such a custom, either known
or constructively known, must have been in the minds of the
parties when they contracted, and if so, must be considered with
other circumstances surrounding the transaction in determining
the intention of the parties. It is obvious as stated in Miller V.
Germain Seed & Plant Co.44 that an intention to warrant cannot
be found in the face of a custom opposed to such intention.
The possibilities of such a ruling are enormous. It is apparent
that a disclaimer is needless in such cases inasmuch as proof of
the custom is sufficient protection against implied warranties.
Would it not seem that widespread acceptance of this logic, to-
gether with the growth of such customs in various businesses,
would practically return the law on this subject to the doctrine of
caveat emptor?
VII. PUBLIC POLICY AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Earlier, in speaking of the right of the parties to define and
restrict their liability, it was stated that this power is unre-
strained as long as it conforms with public policy. But it was not
39. Supra, note 14.
40. 32 A. L. R. 1215, 1244.
41. 150 S. W. 763 (Tex. 1912). See also Cudahy Packing Co. v. Narzisen-
feld, 3 F. (2d) 567 (C. C. A. 2, 1924); and annotations to Uniform Sales
Act sec. 71.
42. Miller v. Germain Seed & Plant Co., 193 Cal. 62, 222 Pac. 817, 32
A. L. R. 1215 (1924); Blizzard Bros. v. Growers' Canning Co., 152 Ia. 257,
132 N. W. 66 (1911). Also in the following cases the decision is based on
the presence of a custom and on an actual disclaimer which was insufficient
of itself to support the decision because of lack of notice; Hooven v. Utah
Nursery Co., 79 Utah 12, 7 P. (2d) 270 (1932); Seattle Seed Co. v. Fuji-
mori, 79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac. 866 (1914); Larson v. Inland Seed Co., 143
Wash. 557, 255 Pac. 919 (1927); and Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., 156
Wis. 327, 144 N. W. 1124 (1914).
43. Supra, note 11. Also see 1 Williston, Sales (2nd ed., 1924) sec. 246;
and annotations to Uniform Sales Act sec. 71.
44. 193 Cal. 62, 222 Pac. 817, 32 A. L. R. 1215 (1924).
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meant by that that a disclaimer of itself violates public policy.
There is dictum in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Frey4 5 that
had there been a disclaimer it would have been contra bonos
mores, but the Supreme Court of Louisiana in a square decision
on the point upheld the right to disclaim. 6 This is in accord with
the prevailing view, 4 7 as is best proved by the numerous cases
involving disclaimers. Indeed, it can hardly be controverted that,
as a general principle, disclaimers do not violate public policy.
But while there is no general opposition among the states to
disclaimers, there are two limitations to the broad policy. Both
of these limitations are statutory in nature. The first type of re-
striction is prohibitive in effect, i. e., in a few states where there
are interests of such vast importance that injury to them would
threaten the resources of the state the legislature has declared
certain specific disclaimers injurious to those interests invalid as
contrary to public policy.45 The constitutionality of such a pro-
hibition against disclaimers in contracts involving farm machin-
ery was upheld in Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jackson.49
But these prohibitions are confined within the limits set in the
legislative declaration of its policy and would not operate against
disclaimers outside of the declared policy.
The second type of restriction is imperative in nature as it
imposes a definite obligation upon the vendor. This new obliga-
tion cannot be termed an implied warranty, but in effect resem-
bles a condition; and like a condition it cannot be disclaimed.5 0
The same liability may be imposed by agreement of the parties
45. 127 La. 183, 186, 53 So. 486 (1910). See also Hall Furniture Co. v.
Crane Breed Mfg. Co., 169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35 (1915) holding an implied
warranty contrary to public policy. But it would seem that the court failed
to distinguish between a condition and a warranty.
46. 12 La. App. 506, 126 So. 460 (1930).
47. Supra, note 1; and Uniform Sales Act sec. 71.
48. Palaniuk v. Allis-Chalmers, 57 N. D. 199, 220 N. W. 638 (1928);
Swift & Co. v. Aydlett, 192 N. C. 330, 135 S. E. 141 (1926); and Swift &
Co. v. Etheridge, 190 N. C. 162, 129 S. E. 453 (1925). The North Dakota
case concerned farming implements and the North Carolina cases involved
fertilizer.
49. 287 U. S. 283, 53 S. Ct. 133, 77 L. ed. 306 (1932).
50. Jones v. Cordele Guano Co., 94 Ga. 14, 20 S. E. 265 (1894); and
Germofert Mfg. Co. v. Cathcart, 104 S. C. 125, 88 S. E. 535 (1916). Cf.
Manglesdorf Seed Co. v. Busby, 118 Old. 255, 247 Pac. 410 (1926); and
Manglesdorf Seed Co. v. Williams, 118 Old. 258, 247 Pac. 413 (1926) in
which it was held that such a statute did not create a new liability, treating
it as an implied warranty, and allowed a disclaimer. These cases should be
compared with the previously cited cases on condition: notes 6, 7, 8, 9, and
10 supra, and especially with Hall Furniture Co. v. Crane Breed Mfg. Co.,
169 N. C. 41, 85 S. E. 35 (1915) in which it was held that an implied war-
ranty (apparently a condition) violated public policy.
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and so take the form of an express warranty.,; As in the case of
the first type of restriction, this second type also is narrow in its
scope. It is limited to the requirement that fertilizer satisfy a
specific chemical analysis or that seed satisfy certain conditional
qualifications. In the seed cases it was held that the statute did
not create a new liability and a disclaimer was allowed.52 But it
would seem that a properly drafted statute would impose an
added obligation beyond those imposed under implied warranties.
A puzzling question arises under cases involving statutory
requirements of satisfaction of chemical analysis or similar war-
ranties as to whether evidence of the effect or result of the fer-
tilizer on the crops is admissible, although it would not be ad-
missible under an implied warranty because of a provision
against warranting results.5 3 The problem, of course, is that of
possibility of misuse of evidence," and the courts have split on
the admissibility of such evidence. Since this is a very unsatis-
factory form of evidence under the circumstances and since bet-
ter evidence ought to be available to show the actual chemical
properties, it would seem best to exclude such proof from the
evidence.
CONCLUSION
It is expected that the use of disclaimers will continue to grow
in the future and that national customs will arise in certain
businesses most suited to this development. Such growth of cus-
toms together with the recognition of the doctrine of nonwar-
ranty by custom, in the absence of disclaimers, would imperil the
position of the buyer who is without peculiar knowledge of the
articles of sale. In those fields where usages do not naturally
develp, but where there is a practice of disclaiming, there will be
the constant effort on the part of sellers to achieve a more effec-
tive draftmanship of disclaimers in order to restrict their lia-
bility to express warranties. This also works against the inter-
ests of the buyer. These developments would tend to return the
law of implied warranties to the principle of caveat emptor.
51. Hampton Guano Co. v. Hill Live Stock Co., 168 N. C. 442, 84 S. E.
774, L. R. A. 1915D 875 (1915); and Carter v. McGill, 171 N. C. 775, 89
S. E. 28 (1916).
52. Manglesdorf Seed Co. v. Busby, 118 Old. 255, 247 Pac. 410 (1926);
and Manglesdorf Seed Co. v. Williams 118 Old. 258, 247 Pac. 413 (1926).
53. See L. R. A. 1915D 875.
54. Such evidence was admitted in Jones v. Cordele Guano Co., 94 Ga. 14,
20 S. E. 265 (1894); Hampton Guano Co. v. Hill Live Stock Co., 168 N. C.
442, 84 S. E. 774, L. R. A. 1915D 875 (1915); and Carter v. McGill, 171
N. C. 775, 89 S. E. 28 (1916). But it was excluded in Germofert Mfg. Co.
v. Cathcart, 104 S. C. 125, 88 S. E. 535 (1916).
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But it is also probable that in the future there will be a move-
ment towards declaring disclaimers in particular fields invalid as
contrary to public policy. Then it is possible too for legislatures
to adopt a policy of imposing additional statutory obligations
wherever it is feasible and deemed necessary for the protection
of a wide class of buyers. It is true that present usages indicate
a limited sphere for the operation of these protective measures,
but there is nothing which confines these trends to their present
bounds. These weapons of the legislature should prove sufficient
to withstand any combined threat on the part of vendors through-
out the country to re-establish the doctrine of caveat emptor.
J. RoBEaT GOTClE.
THE FAIR TRADE ACTS-THE LATEST ATTACK ON THE
LOSS LEADER PROBLEM
The loss leader system is a business scheme whereby a widely
advertised product of standard quality and popular demand is
sold at little or no profit as an inducement to the customer to
enter the store., The loss leader problem has been an outgrowth
of modern marketing. Although it represents only a segment of
the larger problem of price cutting, it has been the subject of a
flood of controversy. 2 The theory is that the impression of low
prices created by offering the leader at a low price will induce
the customer to buy other goods which yield a large profit to the
retailer.3 The result of this plan, so the proponents of resale
price maintenance argue, is a detriment to the interests of other
distributors, to the producer and to the general public.4 It is
asserted to be a detriment to the retailers because it results in
1. Copeland, Resale Price Maintenance, 13 Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (1932) 326; Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Mainte-
nance (1932) part one.
2. The chief arguments against resale price maintenance are put forth
in Note, 19 Col. Law Rev. 265 (1919). See also 28 Adv. and Sell. 29-30(Dec. 17, 1936). The contrary opinion is expressed in Miller, The Mainte-
nance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 22; 178
Printers Ink 100-2 (1937); 40 Sales Management 400 (March 1, 1937). A
comparison of the arguments pro and con may be found in Note, 36 Col. L.
Rev. 293 (1936), and Oppenheim, Cases on Trade Regulation (1936) 834 et
seq.; Note, 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 267 (1936).
3. Seligman and Love, Price Cutting and Price Maintenance (1932) c. 7.
4. Miller, The Maintenance of Uniform Resale Prices (1914) 63 U. of
Pa. L. Rev. 22; Rogers, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade (1913)
27 Harv. L. Rev. 139; Federal Trade Commission, Report on Retail Price
Maintenance (1931).
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